Recent outbreaks of hantavirus and Ebola have drawn global attention, not because they are likely to become pandemics, but because they underscore the continuing need for strong surveillance, rapid response, and effective outbreak control when emerging infectious threats arise.
This article was originally published in Insurance Thought Leadership.
Recent outbreaks of Andes hantavirus and Bundibugyo Ebola have renewed attention on pandemic risk, but neither currently appears likely to cause sustained global spread. Their main significance lies in what they reveal about pandemic preparedness: the importance of rapid detection, effective contact tracing, international coordination, and timely countermeasures.
While disease outbreak severity warrants attention, pandemic potential depends more on efficient human-to-human transmission, pre-symptomatic or respiratory spread, population immunity, and the ability of health systems to respond quickly.
Therefore, these recent outbreaks are best understood not as signals of an imminent pandemic, but as important reminders to remain vigilant, balanced, and guided by the full body of evidence.
The hantavirus outbreak, linked to expedition cruise ship M/V Hondius, illustrates how a rare infection can quickly become a major international containment challenge. In this event, Andes virus infection was first identified more than three weeks after the first death. Epidemiological investigation and viral sequencing suggested that the index patient likely acquired the infection during travel in South America, including areas of Argentina and Chile where the Andes virus is endemic. Because the case was detected in the context of cruise ship travel, passengers and high-risk contacts had already dispersed across multiple countries before the virus was identified.1
The cruise ship setting inevitably recalled memories of the early COVID-19 outbreaks at sea, when ships became symbols of uncertainty, containment challenges, and global spread. Biologically, Andes virus is very different from SARS-CoV-2, but the echoes were familiar: delayed recognition, international passenger dispersal, and the need for rapid cross-border coordination.
This does not make Andes hantavirus a likely pandemic pathogen. Its human-to-human transmission remains limited and requires close contact with respiratory secretion. This outbreak resulted in 13 infections and three deaths, yielding an outbreak-specific case fatality rate (CFR) of approximately 23%. The 42-day follow-up period for contact was completed with no additional secondary cases detected, and the World Health Organization (WHO) officially declared the outbreak over on July 2, 2026.
The event illustrates how global mobility can transform a small outbreak into a complex public health operation.2 Even when the biological risk of sustained spread is low, delayed recognition, international travel, and long monitoring periods can place substantial demands on surveillance, communication, and coordination systems.
The significance of the ongoing Bundibugyo ebolavirus outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with associated cases and transmission previously reported in Uganda, should not be underestimated. This outbreak is spreading much faster than previous Ebola outbreaks and is now the second-largest on record, with a CFR of approximately 44% as of July 30, 2026.3 The WHO has designated the outbreak a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC), reflecting both its severity and the need for coordinated international action. Unlike the Andes hantavirus outbreak, however, it highlights a different set of containment challenges: the consequences of limited surveillance, contact tracing, and diagnostic capacity.
The outbreak response is further complicated because it is caused by a rare species of Ebola without an approved vaccine and the epicenter is an area affected by conflict. Bundibugyo virus is a less common Ebola virus species, and many existing diagnostic tests, vaccines, and treatment strategies historically have been developed with other Ebola virus types in mind. As a result, the outbreak likely went undetected for months, delaying recognition and response.4
Ebola outbreaks demand urgent attention because of their potential for substantial mortality and capacity to disrupt and overwhelm health systems. But disease severity alone does not determine pandemic potential. Ebola generally spreads through direct contact with infectious bodily fluids and is most contagious once symptoms are present, especially during severe illness. These characteristics make sustained global spread much less likely than with a respiratory virus that transmits efficiently before symptoms develop.
The primary concern is not that Ebola will become the next global pandemic but that outbreaks can expand rapidly when they occur in settings where conflict, humanitarian crises, strained healthcare infrastructure, or gaps in diagnostics, contact tracing, and countermeasures hinder early detection and control.
Pandemic risk is not driven by a single feature. The greatest risk arises when several factors merge: a novel pathogen, meaningful disease severity, efficient human-to-human transmission, and low population immunity. Transmissibility is especially important. A virus that spreads through respiratory droplets or aerosols, particularly before symptoms appear, is generally more difficult to contain than one that requires close contact after symptom onset.5
This is why the pandemic potential of Ebola and Andes hantavirus remains low in the current context, despite their seriousness.
In contrast, influenza viruses remain a more persistent pandemic concern because they can spread efficiently between people, transmit before symptoms are recognized, and evolve or reassort into new strains. Avian influenza remains a risk to monitor closely, not because it currently spreads efficiently between humans, but because adaptation could change that risk profile.
Recent evidence adds nuance to the avian influenza risk discussion. Windborne spread of H5N1 between poultry farms via virus-contaminated material from infected bird droppings cannot be ruled out, although it remains difficult to prove and does not necessarily imply efficient airborne transmission between humans. Separately, asymptomatic human H5N1 infections6 have been reported, albeit infrequently and often identified through enhanced surveillance or household contact investigations.7 These findings do not change the current assessment that sustained human-to-human transmission remains limited, but they reinforce why avian influenza requires careful surveillance, especially for changes in transmission dynamics.
This comparison highlights why severity alone is not enough to determine pandemic potential.
The recent hantavirus and Ebola outbreaks particularly draw attention to the system-level drivers of pandemic risk, rather than viral characteristics: global connectivity, weak early detection and response, and limited countermeasures.
Global travel can move exposed individuals across borders before an outbreak is recognized. Delays in diagnosis and containment increase uncertainty and response complexity. Limited availability of pathogen-specific tests, vaccines, and treatments increases vulnerability, even when the pathogen itself has limited pandemic potential.
The Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda and the recent Andes hantavirus outbreak are serious public health events that deserve close attention. Yet despite their severity, neither currently exhibits the transmission characteristics typically associated with sustained global pandemic spread. While both pathogens can cause severe disease and significant mortality, their epidemiological profiles make widespread worldwide transmission unlikely in the current context.
That does not diminish their importance. These outbreaks are reminders that emerging infectious threats continue to test health systems, surveillance capacity, diagnostic readiness, and international coordination. The key takeaway is one of informed vigilance rather than alarm. Pandemic preparedness is not only about identifying the pathogen most likely to cause the next global crisis but also about strengthening the systems that allow us to detect, interpret, contain, and respond to infectious threats before they escalate.
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